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Dramatic increase in disasters and
economic loss
Statistics on the frequency of major natu-
ral disasters and losses resulting from dis-
asters reveal two clear trends: major disas-
ters and economic damage are both
increasing (Figure 1). The common expla-
nations for these trends focus on the
inevitable consequences of development:
climate change, population increase,
assets in risk-prone areas (growth in Gross
World Product), and poorly adapted land
use changes that reduce the buffering
capacity of landscapes. Few ponder the
paradox that while losses from disasters
and investment for research on disaster
theory and methods are rising, our tools
and techniques for hazard assessment and
disaster management are increasingly
being questioned. Since traditional knowl-
edge and techniques have not reversed
the upward trend in losses, it seems obvi-
ous that fundamental conceptual barriers
and profound changes in ecological, eco-
nomic and social processes must be con-
sidered as additional factors, especially in
sensitive ecosystems such as mountain
areas.
The need for new paradigms in
research and practice
It is increasingly recognized that inade-
quate perspectives and poorly adapted
management practices are compounding
problems and contributing to uncertainty.
This forces us to move beyond external
causes to examine “internal” causes—our
perspectives and methods, as well as the
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Recent disaster statistics reflect an alarm-
ing trend of increasing losses from natural
disasters. Typically, the insurance industry,
scientific experts, and thus the media, refer
to such “external” factors as population
increase, the potential for damage in haz-
ard-prone areas, and land use and climate
change as the primary causes of this trend.
Although these factors increase vulnerability
to natural disasters, we argue that “inter-
nal” factors such as disaster-related sci-
ence and policy are also responsible for the
inability to stem or reverse the upward trend
in disaster damage. The paradox of concur-
rent increases in economic loss and disas-
ter-related research raises questions about
the approaches and tools used in hazard
assessment and disaster management. This
in turn raises the possibility that progress is
being blocked by fundamental conceptual
barriers, in addition to profound changes in
environmental and social processes, neither
of which are adequately being addressed.
We conclude with some thought-provoking
suggestions for addressing problems in dis-
aster management.
FIGURE 1, A AND B Increase in major natural disasters (A) and economic losses (B) since
1950. The trend curves verify the alarming increase in losses from disasters in the past 5
decades. (Source: Munich Re Group 2003)
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social patterns that contribute to the risk
of disaster.
“Internal” rather than “external” focus
We must first overcome denial: difficulties
in quantifying uncertainty often lead to a
failure to address uncertainty at all, espe-
cially with regard to social processes. As a
result, we use reductionist approaches to
study natural disaster-related aspects
whose driving forces can be tightly con-
trolled and manipulated, ie, external fac-
tors such as geophysical processes that we
can engineer.
At the same time, we often avoid the
study of complex human–nature interac-
tions, for which we often lack social and
environmental data at the appropriate
spatial and temporal scales. Traditional
hazard mitigation policy considers natu-
ral hazards as isolated, linear processes.
With flooding, for example, most risk
analyses consider a line of causality that
proceeds from meteorological conditions
through temporal and spatial variability
to the (economic) impact of floods on
society. This emphasis on nature as a set
of determinants, without adequate inte-
gration of social, political, legislative and
biophysical contexts, has led to a narrow
focus on geophysical processes and risk
exposure, and a preference for technical
fixes and structural measures in risk man-
agement. On the other hand, many social
scientists model disasters as primarily
negative events with solely economic
impacts on society and, consequently,
most models reflect only utilitarian func-
tions both abstracted from the biophysi-
cal world and from socio-ecological con-
sequences.
Complex rather than linear approaches
Hence natural risk management options
reflect a biased analysis of causality, and
present linear cause-and-effect approaches
that blind us to the reality of how complex
adaptive systems operate at multiple lev-
els. Since most people see life as a series
of events and ignore system structure
(feedback loops) and behavior (delays,
emerging properties with unexpected
impacts), disasters are rarely viewed as an
integral part of a much larger develop-
ment context.
As a result, policy options are con-
strained to reactionary, end-of-the-pipeline
responses such as emergency management
or humanitarian assistance. Unsurprisingly,
disaster management is an event-focused
reaction, based on schemes and programs
that treat those affected as “clients,” with a
culture of experts and technology that do
things to and for them, rather than together
with them. Communicating and transport-
ing different ideas and concepts between
social systems is still problematic, given the
different operating principles and vocabu-
laries in disaster-related science and policy.
Traditional flood engineering, for instance,
provides concrete results that relieve anxi-
ety about uncertainty but often reduce
options for adding natural capacity to
absorb runoff and flexibly integrate differ-
ent disciplines that could also contribute to
flood prevention.
Increasing resilience
How can we broaden the focus of risk man-
agement to simultaneously decrease the
impacts of disasters and increase the capaci-
ty to respond, while working between crises
to increase the resilience and adaptiveness
of society to natural hazards? Above all, we
must improve our understanding of func-
tional uncertainties in complex dynamic sys-
tems and broaden cooperation throughout
society, across different sectors, disciplines,
political borders, and spatial and temporal
scales. This requires integration of manage-
ment and development policy over the
short, medium and long terms, as well as
generation and adoption of paradigms that
reflect our emerging understanding of
processes operating at a variety of temporal
and spatial scales (see Box 1 and Figure 2).
We therefore recommend the establishment
of a disaster-related science policy forum
that elaborates holistic programs—tempo-
rally and financially adapted to the long-
term horizon of disaster-related problems—
and thereby addresses and communicates
problems of uncertainty.
A narrow, event-oriented, reductionist
view cannot portray holistically complex
dynamic systems. Scientific education
should be restructured to include courses
and training in system dynamics, helping
students to perceive themselves as a part
of a larger ecosystem, one in which their
“People now live in
more risky areas and
the vulnerability of the
insured objects has
increased—for example
if a PC or television gets
wet, you have to throw
it away.” (Jens
Mehlhorn, head of the
flood group at Swiss Re
in Zurich)
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actions help to shape the Earth in ways
large or small, positive and negative. On
the practical side, we must enhance flexi-
bility by emphasizing science as a process
that fosters reassessment and is integrated
with management practices.
One collaborative framework that has
proven useful in disaster management is
Adaptive Management, which allows peo-
ple involved in science, policy-making,
economic affairs and education to collab-
orate in developing and communicating
new ideas and practices to address uncer-
tainty. Such citizen–science dialogues
broaden stakeholder participation in for-
mulating and criticizing goals, constraints,
“It is a tragic irony that
1998, the penultimate
year of the Disaster
Reduction Decade, was
also a year in which
natural disasters
increased so dramati-
cally[...]. It is becoming
increasingly clear that
the term ‘natural’ for
such events is a mis-
nomer.” (UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan at
the closing ceremonies
for the UN Internation-
al Decade for Natural
Disaster Reduction in
1999)
Can we learn from an integrated early warning system designed over 200 years ago?
Natural hazards are embedded in a spatial
and temporal context; improvement of
approaches to deal with them requires inter-
disciplinary research teams and advanced
research methods. Historical and autobio-
graphical research bears significant potential
for hazard research because it enables those
exposed to disaster to ensure that their risk
perceptions are recorded and integrated into
culturally sensitive bottom-up mitigation
strategies and disaster reduction programs.
Moreover, participatory research methodolo-
gies make it possible for communities and
researchers to gain a better understanding of
issues affecting communities. Thus, research
becomes a reciprocal process in which tradi-
tional top-down hierarchies are dismantled
and all participants become equal collabora-
tors, for the benefit of cost-efficient risk man-
agement.
Natural disasters such as floods do not
occur in a social or historical vacuum. This is
why flood hazard research needs to combine
knowledge of social and natural factors, as
well as historical and contemporary approach-
es and tools. Societies exposed to natural dis-
asters should not be assessed ahistorically—
as is often done after great flood disasters,
where post-disaster research and reports
focus mainly on meteorological conditions,
geo-hydrological aspects, and technical fixes
and measures. Based on a comparative
assessment of a contemporary prediction sys-
tem and a 200-year-old early flood warning 
system on the Elbe river in Saxony, Germany
(Figure 2), recent hazard research suggests
that there is a need to support the (re-)devel-
opment of a collective memory regarding large-
scale natural disasters, in order to increase
contemporary awareness and adapt response
mechanisms. Indeed, today the different com-
ponents of flood early warning systems are fre-
quently considered in isolation, and expensive
flood forecasting is promoted without ade-
quately addressing the distribution and imple-
mentation of flood warnings—as was demon-
strated by the Elbe river flood in 2002.
Historical research has revealed that along
the same problematic stretch of river, more
than 200 years ago the authorities already suc-
cessfully stemmed major flood risks for many
decades, after massive damage resulting from
an extreme event in February 1784. In the win-
ter of 1798/99, realizing that the weather pat-
tern might recreate the dangerous conditions of
1784, with a frozen river and enormous
amounts of snow accumulated upstream, which
could suddenly thaw, leading to huge ice blocks
and water masses invading the area, the Saxon
authorities designed an elaborate early warning
system based on collective close observation
of the environment and involvement of the pop-
ulation and the army. A legal act was passed to
regulate flood prevention measures, including
the implementation of 16 signal cannons along
the Saxon Elbe river. The army was instructed
to make the ice masses explode with bombs
and cannon balls if necessary. Officers were
asked to reconnoiter the hazardous areas along
the riverbanks where ice was known to have
accumulated before, and to determine the best
routes for intervention. If bombing the ice
masses was found not to suffice and sudden
flooding was to be expected, the army was
instructed to use signal cannons to warn the
population downstream. An existing procedure
was refined to operate this acoustic warning
system. Starting with the warning post furthest
upstream within Saxony, each post was to
shoot three warning signals for the guard fur-
ther down the valley as soon as the ice jam-
ming broke up or the water rose beyond a cer-
tain level. The population was thus warned ear-
ly enough to be able to protect itself and its
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different scenarios and policy options, so
that political “buy-in” increases.
Whatever approach we use must con-
tribute to an ongoing process that does
not focus on isolated physical processes
or single events but on human develop-
ment as a whole. In this regard, scientists
and practitioners have to increase their
awareness of the linkages between disas-
ters and development, and the implica-
tions of these linkages for their work. In
practice, disaster and development are
treated in different arenas within the edu-
cational and political system: separate
ministries, disciplines, departments, pro-
grams, budgets, literature, and space and
“Mitigation has to be
done at the local level.
The people living in
hazard-prone areas and
having practical knowl-
edge and experience
have to be involved in
the planning processes.
We should not dictate
mitigation from the top
down; but financing it
is another question.”
(Interview with Markus
Priesterath, instructor
at the Kuratorium
Fluthilfe, Department of
the Interior, Germany,
after the 2002 Elbe
flood)
possessions against impending flooding. Imple-
mentation of this system reduced massive dam-
age and casualties. The local authorities also
had to ensure that sufficient personnel and infra-
structure were available to protect the dikes,
defrost bridges, and provide the population with
food and clothing whenever necessary.
By re-activating such historical data, hazard
and disaster researchers could help broaden
contemporary hazard research perspectives,
develop a collective disaster memory, and design
adequate self-help measures adapted to local
environments.
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time frames, often with minimal relation
to each other.
Disaster management is more than
the science of adept reaction to crisis or a
policy of professionalized, event-focused
response. Rather, it must become a contin-
uous effort to assess all processes that
influence risk at all scales. Such flexible
learning processes increase our resilience
to shock, as we diminish the impact of dis-
turbance and increase our adaptability to
uncertainty. To move beyond entrenched
concepts that can block new ideas and
methods, we need to use techniques such
as modeling and employ all the informa-
tion available to improve our knowledge
about system behavior in crisis. We also
need to enhance “Double Loop Learning”
by making our paradigms explicit and sub-
ject to revision. Table 1 lists suggestions
that might help integrate diverse views
and techniques into disaster-related
research and practice.
Future courses of action
The “precautionary principle” was recent-
ly proposed at the European level as a par-
adigm to further promote risk-related dia-
logue. As we have seen, the farther we
look into the future, the more uncertain
we are about functional relationships,
interdependencies and outcomes. And
since we can never predict with certainty
what action—or lack of action—will trig-
ger a disaster, we cannot define with cer-
tainty what it is that requires precaution.
We appear trapped in cycles of recurring
disasters when, in the face of such contin-
uing uncertainty, technical solutions
remain the dominant scientific approach
and the default bureaucratic reflex.
Science and policy require more than
technology or structural defense measures
to address uncertainty. They involve
human action—a social process in which
knowledge and convictions are created
From…  …to
Hazard/risk concept Vulnerability/resilience concept
Local focus Broader context
Short-term results Long-term relationship funding
Equilibrium thinking Critical state behavior
Prediction Complex understanding
Symptoms Causal analysis across scales
Single parameter Integrated research
Quantitative physical studies Qualitative social studies
Physical process-based approaches Site hazard approaches
Reports by experts Science policy forums
Event-oriented reductionism Systems thinking
Re-active management Pro-active management
Expert planning Stakeholder participation
Top-down organization Bottom-up organization
Command-and-control solutions Social audit solutions
Intervention Self-help and capacity building
Response Mitigation
Probabilities Possibilities
TABLE 1 Proposals for
disaster-related research and
practice to adopt diverse views
and techniques. (Modified after
Weichselgartner and
Obersteiner 2002)
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rather than certainties. Both the Nether-
lands and Switzerland offer good exam-
ples (“Space for Rivers” initiatives) of
stakeholder-driven collaboration between
society and scientists that is developing
innovative approaches to flood hazards
(Figure 3). Recognizing that engineered
solutions cannot deliver full flood security,
these programs allow experimentation
with new policies and practices that
increase society’s resilience to floods and
reestablish natural processes as the struc-
turing agents for the river basin. Similar
programs could help confront threats to
mountain ecosystems—including invasive
species, land degradation, natural haz-
ards, pollution, fragmentation, and mass
tourism—by experimenting with innova-
tive views, theories, policies and practices
to address conflicts emerging from the
twin goals of preserving nature and pro-
moting development.
FIGURE 3 The result of a
“Space for Rivers” initiative in
Switzerland: the resilience of
the Emme valley to flooding
has been increased by allowing
part of the Emme to return to
its natural riverbed. This
structural measure is cost-
efficient, protects the river
against undesired influx (thus
improving water quality), helps
conserve a natural ecosystem,
and improves the quality of
recreation areas. View of the
Emme near Utzenstorf. (Photo
courtesy of the Federal Office
for Water and Geology, FOWG)
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